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 On 3 October 2015, the U.S. Navy met an odd milestone when it decom-missioned USS Simpson—the last modern ship in its fleet to have sunk an 
enemy warship. Simpson had sunk the Iranian ship Joshan twenty-seven years 
earlier during an obscure deployment to the Persian Gulf from 1987 to 1989 to 
protect eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers and preserve freedom of navigation through 
the Strait of Hormuz.
In 1987, when the episode began, the Cold War was hot. Despite ongoing 
negotiations over conventional and intermediate nuclear forces, U.S. and Soviet 
proxies faced off in Nicaragua and Afghanistan. The Iran-Contra hearings were 
about to begin, and the Iran-Iraq War was starting its seventh year. Iraqi and 
Iranian forces were sinking neutral oil tankers and other merchant ships moving 
cargo through the Strait of Hormuz at an alarming rate.
It was in this environment that President Ron-
ald W. Reagan authorized the Kuwaiti tankers to 
be reflagged as American ships and given a sizable 
naval escort, including Simpson. The deployment, 
code-named Operation EARNEST WILL, stood out 
as the U.S. Navy’s largest and most complicated 
surface-warfare operation since World War II, and 
it was a rare example of the United States using 
force to protect access to crude oil. EARNEST WILL 
was a contentious deployment, and Congress de-
manded assurances that U.S. forces, if deployed, 
would be protected, to avoid friendly casualties.
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Participants and historians judge the operation to have been a success, al-
though there has been little counterfactual analysis to ascertain what would 
have happened had the United States done nothing.1 We should seek to under-
stand why we deploy forces abroad and evaluate each deployment on whether 
it succeeded in achieving its mission. Strategists use many criteria to determine 
whether deployments should occur, but minimally these missions should be 
moral efforts of last resort when diplomacy has failed (or used in conjunction 
with diplomacy) and tied to a nation’s grand strategy.
This grand strategy can take many forms, but generally constitutes “a nation-
state’s theory on how to produce security for itself,” or, as Cold War historian 
John Lewis Gaddis wrote, “how one uses whatever one has to get to wherever it 
is one wants to go.”2 A well-formed strategy must be feasible and have a decent 
probability of success. It must be suitable; that is, the strategy, if successful, actu-
ally will produce the desired policy goal. Finally, the strategy must be acceptable, 
meaning that the nation is willing to bear the cost of the strategy, as measured in 
lives, treasure, prestige, and leadership focus.
Given the stakes, one would think that grand strategies and the deployments 
that support them are well thought out. This does not seem to be so. Some re-
search suggests that much American strategy has been improvised on the fly.3 
Scholars such as Richard Neustadt, Ernest May, and Yuen Khong argue that indi-
vidual policy decisions, such as particular deployments, are driven by a series of 
messy analytic models that include poor analogical thinking instead of structured 
analytic techniques.4
The EARNEST WILL deployment is an example of an ad hoc improvisation in 
the context of two developed U.S. strategies: the policy of containment and the 
Carter Doctrine. As a deployment, it was anomalous because of its size, the fe-
rocity with which it was executed (the American joint task force [JTF] ultimately 
sank a large portion of the Iranian navy), and its adoption in the face of con-
gressional opposition. An outlier such as this invites examination. We therefore 
should try to understand what strategic forces drove EARNEST WILL. Analysis of 
this case study can help us examine what practical realities drive states’ foreign 
policies. When faced with multiple principles (such as containment and the 
Carter Doctrine), which are the more powerful influencers?
This article assesses two possible drivers. The first is that EARNEST WILL was 
executed as an extension of President Reagan’s Cold War strategy. The Soviet 
Union had offered to solve the security issues in the Gulf. Keeping the Soviet 
Union out meant keeping U.S. forces in, and it also meant pulling Kuwait into 
an American-provided security convoy regime. In this explanation, EARNEST 
WILL was a shrewd, neorealist example of offshore balancing. A second op-
tion is that oil economics was the main driver behind the deployment. The U.S. 
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 2, Art. 8
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss2/8
 M A RV I N  8 3
State Department’s official policy rationale for EARNEST WILL stated that “the 
unimpeded flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz is a vital interest and criti-
cal to the economic health of the Western world.”5 The oil had to be protected, 
as it all went into the global spot and futures markets, which affected the price 
Americans paid at the gas pump. The Carter Doctrine was explicit that this was 
a national interest, and in the past, when oil supplies were disrupted, it sent 
the U.S. economy reeling. In this situation, the Persian Gulf was a critical piece 
of the economic global commons, and the United States was the protector of the 
global town green.
THE ROAD TO WAR: THE SHAH, THE HOSTAGES,  
AND THE IRAQI INVASION
On 22 September 1980, Iraq commenced a mechanized invasion of Iran with 
twenty-two divisions equipped with modern Soviet weapons. Iraqi president 
Saddam Hussein thought his force could seize oil fields and the Shatt al Arab 
waterway quickly from an Iranian army still in disorder from the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution. Hussein also feared that Iran might export its revolutionary brand of 
Islam to Iraq’s predominantly Shia population. The Iraqi invasion initially made 
good progress; Iran quickly rallied, however, drawing from a deep well of revolu-
tionary fervor and a population three times the size of Iraq’s. For years the ground 
war, while not exactly a stalemate, produced no decisive results.
America from the start tilted toward Iraq. Iran’s status in America had shifted 
from key strategic partner to terrorist menace. In the 1970s, relations between 
the United States and Iran’s monarch, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (the 
shah), were warm. The United Kingdom had been the Persian Gulf ’s traditional 
protector and offshore balancer for much of the twentieth century, but in 1971 
the United Kingdom withdrew from “east of the Suez,” closing its naval base in 
Bahrain. With the United States overextended at the time and trying to disengage 
from Vietnam, Britain presented the move as a fait accompli.6 Henry Kissinger 
recalled the dilemma: “[T]here was no possibility of assigning any American 
military forces to the Indian Ocean in the midst of the Vietnam war and its atten-
dant trauma.”7 America filled the void with the Nixon Doctrine, a stratagem that 
called for the two pillars of Iran and Saudi Arabia to provide security in the Gulf. 
Iran, well funded with petrodollars and well equipped with advanced American 
weapons, approached the task with zeal—until the shah’s overthrow in 1979.
America tried to work with the subsequent Ayatollah Khomeini regime, with 
the Pentagon announcing shipments of spare parts to the Iranian military as 
late as October 1979.8 But in November 1979, Iranian students seized fifty-four 
hostages in the U.S. embassy in Tehran in retaliation for the U.S. government 
allowing the shah into the United States for medical treatment. In April 1980, 
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President Jimmy Carter, perceived by many as overseeing a dovish foreign 
policy, launched U.S. special operations forces on an audacious rescue mission 
to recover the Americans. Aircraft malfunctions doomed the raid, and eight U.S. 
servicemembers died in a collision. The Iranians displayed their bodies and the 
destroyed aircraft for the world to see—a spectacle that added to the dual humili-
ations of deposed ally and captive diplomats. Tehran finally released the hostages 
on 20 January 1981, as part of a deal that netted the regime $2.8 billion in assets 
previously frozen by the United States.9 In a final affront to President Carter, the 
airplane bearing the hostages did not depart Iran until a few minutes after Ronald 
Reagan was sworn into office. They had been held captive for 444 days.
Although Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade was unilateral, Iran saw the 
attack, which occurred during the American hostage crisis, as part of a wider 
effort to bring harm to the country and end the Khomeini revolution. Bruce 
Riedel, a former intelligence analyst specializing in the Iran-Iraq War, explains 
the thinking:
Iranians call the war the “Imposed War” because they believe the United States 
subjected them to the conflict and orchestrated the global “tilt” toward Iraq. They 
note that the United Nations [UN] did not condemn Iraq for starting the war. In 
fact, the UN did not even discuss the war for weeks after it started, and it ultimately 
considered Iraq to be the aggressor only years later, as part of a deal orchestrated by 
President George H. W. Bush to free the remaining U.S. hostages held by pro-Iranian 
terrorists in Lebanon.10
WAR FOOTING
The “Imposed War” soon required full mobilization of both combatants’ citizen-
ries and economies. One analyst has estimated the total cost of the war to both 
economies at $1.097 trillion, and noted that the sum “exceeds by $678.5 billion 
the entire oil revenue received by both countries, ever since they started to sell 
their oil on the world market.”11
Much of this money went to weapons purchases. In 1980, Iraq imported $2.24 
billion worth of weapons, a figure that increased to $3.285 billion by 1982.12 Iran’s 
imports were anemic by comparison: $278 million in 1980, when it was in a state 
of revolution but still on a peacetime footing, increasing to $541 million by 1982. 
In 1983, the United States initiated Operation STAUNCH, an effort to stop the flow 
of arms, not to the aggressor but to Iran, on the grounds that the Iranian govern-
ment would not negotiate a cease-fire. During a hearing to justify EARNEST WILL, 
the State Department’s Under Secretary for Political Affairs described STAUNCH, 
then in its fourth year of existence, as “vigorous diplomatic efforts—through 
intelligence-sharing and strong demarches—to block or complicate Iranian arms 
resupply efforts on a worldwide basis.”13
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Oil exports were critical to fuel the war machines of both sides. The war cut off 
Iraq’s access to the Persian Gulf, leaving more than seventy merchant ships stuck 
in the ports of Umm Qasr, Shatt, and Khorramshahr. Shells and bullets impacted 
them and their egress to the Gulf slowly silted up. Insurers eventually wrote off 
the trapped ships as constructive total losses and paid out more than $450 million 
to various policy holders.14
Baghdad adapted by exporting oil via pipeline and importing weapons and 
dry goods overland after off-loading at ports in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
and Kuwait. Since its navy was small, Iraq used its air force to strike military 
and economic targets in the Iranian littorals. Kharg Island, Iran’s major loading 
point for crude oil, was a frequent target, and Iran soon fortified the location 
with missiles, decoys, and antiaircraft guns in a mode reminiscent of European 
cities during World War II. In October 1981, Iraq began using French helicopters 
equipped with French Exocet antiship missiles to attack neutral ships heading 
for Iran. Tankers loading crude at Kharg were a favorite target, and Iranian oil 
revenue suffered.
Iran declared its territorial waters a war zone shortly after the invasion and 
stated it would blockade Iraq (both legal moves under the laws of armed con-
flict), but initially the government did not try to interdict shipping heading 
to Iraq. By September 1982, after months of Iraqi attacks on Iranian shipping, 
Tehran’s tone changed. That month, speaker of the Iranian parliament Ali Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani told the Japanese ambassador, “We care a lot about the secu-
rity of the Persian Gulf . . . but if others do not leave it safe and want to secure only 
their own interest and thereby use it against us, perhaps then we will not let it be 
safe for anyone.”15 Iranian rhetoric intensified, but it was not until 13 May 1984, 
after dozens of ships servicing Iran were hit, that the Iranian air force retaliated 
by putting an American-made Maverick missile into the side of Umm Casbah, a 
Kuwaiti oil tanker.16
Denied Iraqi targets, Iran felt justified in targeting third-party shipping, for 
two reasons. First, it deduced that Iraq was receiving commercial goods and war 
matériel via “neutral” ports, such as those in Kuwait and the UAE. Second, the 
Arab Gulf states had tilted openly against Persian (and Shiite-ruled) Iran. Dur-
ing the war, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states gave Iraq between 
twenty-five and fifty billion dollars in financial assistance.17 Eight days after the 
Umm Casbah attack, the GCC asked the UN Security Council (UNSC) to ad-
dress Iranian aggression. The UNSC condemned Iranian actions on 1 June 1984, 
in UNSC Resolution 552, a document that demanded that there “should be no 
interference with ships en route to and from States that are not parties to the 
hostilities.” UNSC Resolution 552 made no mention of Iraqi maritime attacks, 
which were allowed under the laws of armed conflict, nor did it address Iranian 
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grievances about the thin neutrality that GCC members such as Kuwait displayed 
during the conflict.
Stymied on the battlefield and geographically isolated in the Gulf, with only 
a short list of arms suppliers, Iran must have felt increasingly isolated politically 
at this point as well. Additionally, the world’s two superpowers had weighed in 
against Iran. The Soviet Union was, of course, Iraq’s number one arms supplier. 
By 1984, the United States tilted against Iran in at least two ways. The first was 
Operation STAUNCH, its arms-restriction effort. The second was a small deploy-
ment of U.S. Air Force jets called ELF-1.
The Iran-Iraq War alarmed Saudi Arabia, which moved most of its oil through 
the Persian Gulf. Shiite Iran was a traditional foe of Sunni Saudi Arabia, which 
backed Iraq. Saudi Aramco’s massive oil-processing facility and anchorage at 
Ras Tanura is 145 kilometers from an Iranian air force base at Bushehr—a mere 
fifteen-minute flight time for an Iranian F-4 Phantom. The Saudis requested and 
received deployment of American E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control 
System (AWACS) aircraft and refueling tankers. E-3s flown by the ELF-1 mission 
stood sentinel over Ras Tanura and the western Gulf from October 1980 until the 
end of the Iran-Iraq War. The E-3s’ mission was early warning, and the deploy-
ment was defensive, but it gave U.S. and Saudi air forces eyes over the battlefield 
over a four-hundred-kilometer radius from the aircraft’s orbit.
ESCALATION AND CONTINUED AMERICAN TILTING  
TOWARD IRAQ
Iran eventually retaliated by declaring large parts of the Gulf “free fire zones” 
and striking an increasing number of tankers and merchantmen with naval and 
air forces. In the 1980s, oil was cheap, and a glut of shipping meant crews vol-
unteered to sail the Strait of Hormuz even as the tally of damaged and destroyed 
ships grew. Still, economic pressure built with the tempo of the attacks. Fifty 
ships were hit in 1985, ninety-seven in 1986.18 During the summer of 1985, Iran 
started boarding ships transiting the Gulf as well. The Strait of Hormuz made an 
excellent choke point for these operations, as it narrowed to only twenty-three 
nautical miles, and most traffic used a much narrower set of shipping lanes. Iran 
also controlled the islands of Tunb and Abu Musa, located to the west of the strait, 
and observed or launched warships from bases there.
Boarding and inspection were legal under the laws of armed conflict for the 
purposes of seizing contraband, which third parties were funneling to Iraq. On 
12 January 1986, a crew from an Iranian frigate boarded SS President Taylor, 
a U.S. ship in the Gulf of Oman, east of the Strait of Hormuz and outside the 
Persian Gulf proper. Taylor was heading to the UAE port of Fujairah to pick up 
packaged food aid bound for India. U.S. policy makers initially considered the 
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incident “a matter of serious concern,” but later conceded that the search was 
legal. Warships escorted subsequent U.S. merchantmen. In May 1986, an Iranian 
frigate tried to stop SS President McKinley during a Gulf passage but backed off 
when McKinley’s destroyer escort, USS David R. Ray, requested that it do so.19 
The United States, long a proponent of freedom of navigation, clearly felt its 
ships’ rights to avoid inspection trumped that of Iran to interdict contraband 
cargo. Fujairah was known as a transshipment point for cargo heading to Iraq, so 
Iran’s inspection efforts in the Gulf of Oman were logical. However, the United 
States in 1986, with hostages held by Iranian-backed Shiite militants in Lebanon 
and its memory still seared by the detention and torment of the fifty-four dip-
lomats seized in 1979, naturally was reluctant to allow any detention, however 
brief, of its mariners by Iran.
During this time, hull insurance rates climbed fivefold for ships heading to 
Kuwait. It appeared that Iranian antishipping efforts, while threatening shipping 
heading to all GCC countries, were paying particular attention to Kuwait-bound 
traffic, including its supertankers. The U.S. defense intelligence establishment 
had concluded as much by the fall of 1986.20 The GCC met to discuss the prob-
lem and develop protective schemes on 1 November 1986, but it did not reach a 
consensus.
Kuwait proved more interested than the others in pursuing alternative solu-
tions to the Iranian antishipping attacks. Admiral William J. Crowe, USN, Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1985–89, suggested that Saudi Arabia’s hesitance 
to seek an armed solution came from a national culture that preferred quiet di-
plomacy to resolve disputes, as well as the sheer size of the Saudi oil trade, which 
could absorb the loss of the occasional oil tanker.21 In contrast, Crowe suggested 
that Kuwait’s oil industry, while rich, was more sensitive to the threat posed to 
the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company (KOTC), which was owned by the Kuwaiti royal 
family.
David Crist, a historian who wrote an academic history of Operation 
EARNEST WILL, argues that Kuwait’s precarious geostrategic position drove it to 
seek a military solution to the Iranian threat. Kuwait’s existence as an independent 
nation-state was, in the words of a former U.S. ambassador to the country, “an ac-
cident of history.”22 Iraq resented Kuwait’s existence. The country had no national 
bureaucratic or technical class. Kuwait accepted thousands of Palestinian refu-
gees after 1948. The Palestinians and their children ran much of the nation, while 
native-born Kuwaiti Bedouins reaped the benefits of the country’s oil wealth. 
As a result, Kuwait felt constantly insecure—“a defenseless state surrounded by 
wolves.”23 This encouraged diplomatic hedging. Kuwait was the only Gulf country 
with full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. It bought both Western and 
Soviet weapons. It refused to close its embassy in Tehran even after Iran bombed 
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the country and marked its merchant shipping for destruction. Of course, 
Kuwait—even while this was happening—also was assisting Iraq’s war by trans-
ferring weapons from its war stocks to Baghdad, accepting foreign military car-
goes (contraband under the laws of armed conflict) and shipping them overland 
to Iraq, and extending loans and grants to the financially strapped regime. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that in the fall of 1986, the Kuwaiti government ap-
proached both the Soviet Union and the United States to see whether those na-
tions were interested in providing security for Kuwaiti tankers.
AMERICA’S ASSESSMENT AND POLICY FORMULATION
Soviet diplomats responded by saying that Kuwaiti tankers could be reflagged 
and would receive Soviet naval protection by doing little more than hoisting 
the hammer and sickle. The American request wended its way through the U.S. 
State Department slowly. After SS President McKinley avoided being boarded and 
searched, as Taylor had been in January 1986, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
must have felt that it had solved the Gulf ’s freedom-of-navigation problem, at 
least for itself. The hull insurance market was reeling, but, with most premiums 
backed by Lloyd’s of London, this was primarily a British business problem. Op-
eration STAUNCH continued, fitfully. AWACS radar planes of the ELF-1 mission 
continued their monotonous surveillance flights, and U.S. warships occasionally 
plied the Gulf and visited their tiny base in Bahrain. Certainly, the Iran-Iraq War 
was a tragedy, and the United States clearly had tilted (although not by official 
policy) toward Iraq, but there did not seem to be reason to intervene militarily 
over Gulf maritime traffic beyond escorting U.S.-flagged vessels.
In fact, the oil markets scarcely registered the uptick of shipping attacks in 
the Gulf. In one way, Iran helped depress the flight of oil. Most of its crude was 
exported through oil terminals on Kharg Island, a perennial favorite for Iraqi air 
strikes. Iran offered steep discounts for companies willing to fuel up at Kharg, 
and even self-insured tankers for the period that they were loading. Oil prices 
had plunged since the heady days of the 1970s, when the Gulf states posted 
record profits and the West, particularly America, feared the Arab “oil weapon” 
in the shape of an embargo. Market forces fueled investments in oil exploration 
and efficiency in the 1970s, and by the early 1980s prices dropped. By November 
1986, the world was less than a year away from the introduction of the Brent spot 
market, a benchmark created on the basis of crude oil extracted from the North 
Sea that was to compete with the industry standard of West Texas Intermediate 
(WTI). Brent’s arrival indicated new abundance and a shift in the world oil mar-
ket’s center of gravity. The futures market for WTI, a benchmark for crude oil, 
started 1986 at twenty-six dollars per barrel; by Monday, 3 November—the first 
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trading day after the GCC meeting and Kuwait’s failed attempt to hammer out a 
deal on tanker security—WTI had fallen to $14.71.24
After 3 November, the U.S. government had even fewer reasons to focus on 
the tanker war in the Gulf. On that day, As Shiraa (The Sail), a Lebanese news-
paper, published a story stating that the United States was shipping weapons to 
Iran despite having sanctions against that country.25 Further revelations showed 
that the proceeds from these sales were used to fund freedom fighters battling 
Nicaragua’s communist government, in circumvention of Congress’s Boland 
Amendment. The Iran-Contra scandal had broken, and its revelation harmed 
America’s standing worldwide, especially among Arab nations, who bridled at the 
superpower’s duplicity.26 Rear Admiral Harold J. Bernsen, USN, commander of 
Middle East naval forces, learned of the scandal during a meeting with a Lebanese 
defense official: “When I walked in the door, I realized I was in trouble,” the ad-
miral recalled. In the course of a severe dressing-down, the official told Bernsen, 
“[Y]ou can tell all of your buddies that they might as well not come around here 
anymore.”27 Handling international and domestic blowback absorbed the atten-
tion of Reagan’s national security staff, ensuring that Kuwait’s request remained 
second-page news for a while.
In contrast to the Soviets’ quick and unequivocal response, the U.S. State De-
partment, after consulting with the U.S. Coast Guard, relayed a litany of require-
ments to the Kuwaitis. These included that (1) reflagged vessels must be owned 
by a U.S. person, via a company incorporated in the United States; (2) vessels 
must be inspected by the U.S. Coast Guard for safety, to ensure, for instance, 
that they had the proper number of fire extinguishers on board; (3) vessels must 
have an American master during operation; and (4) vessels must have American 
names. While initially cool to the prospect of reflagging, U.S. administration 
officials, particularly Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, came to like 
the idea, as it would counter Soviet and Iranian objectives simultaneously while 
protecting U.S. oil supplies.
Weinberger, an avowed anticommunist, took Kuwaiti overtures to the Soviets 
seriously. Given the free world’s dependence on the Gulf ’s oil, he considered an 
increased Soviet presence there threatening, later stating, “I was, and still am, 
convinced that it was not in our interest for Soviet forces to move into an area 
so vital to us. . . . We in the West need the Gulf ’s oil resources; the Soviets are 
more than self-sufficient in oil. Their position in the Gulf, should they achieve 
a vital presence there, could only be one of denial toward us. They would gain a 
tremendous strategic advantage I did not want them to have.”28 American defense 
planners did not want to open the Strait of Hormuz to the Soviet navy one inch. 
Weinberger dismissed claims that his enthusiasm for the reflagging constituted 
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the United States being “played” by the Soviets. Oil fueled the free world’s econ-
omy, and U.S. strategists loathed the thought of the Soviets being in a position to 
interdict its movement.
Admiral Crowe also concurred with the reflagging plan. While he agreed that 
Weinberger’s dual objectives were sound, the chairman thought that relationship 
building justified the action; “it seemed to me that reflagging would go a long way 
toward mending our fences in the region.”29 Crowe had experience working in the 
Middle East and had participated in negotiating basing rights for the U.S. Navy in 
Bahrain in the 1970s. Additionally, Crowe hinted in his memoirs that ideational 
factors—a visceral antipathy for Iran—may have affected his support. The USN 
ships already in the Gulf witnessed many of Iran’s attacks on neutral shipping. 
These captains did not see a blockaded Iran striking back at Arabs smuggling 
war matériel into Iraq; they only heard calls for help on the radio as Iranian ships 
attacked merchantmen and observed the aftermath of damaged ships bearing the 
flags and crews of U.S. allies. Historian Harold Wise captured the sentiment of 
USN sailors prior to EARNEST WILL.
One Iranian ship . . . named Sabalan, gained a notorious reputation for these activi-
ties. The captain of Sabalan, known as Captain Nasty to Americans, would board 
tankers bound for Kuwait, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia, and pretend to carry out a friendly 
inspection . . . then, once the charade was over, Captain Nasty would order an attack 
on his defenseless prey. Often, Captain Nasty would send a parting message by radio 
to his victim and say “Have a nice day.” . . . Many times, American ships watched 
helplessly as both sides [Iran and Iraq] left merchants and tankers in flames.30
Stories such as that of Captain Nasty would have been related to the Navy 
ships’ local commander, Admiral Bernsen, and likely upward in the chain of 
command to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Crowe. Crowe may have 
had Sabalan in mind when he recalled his feelings toward Iranian conduct in 
the Gulf: “During my recent Gulf visit I had heard firsthand from the Middle 
East Force’s commanders and men about the unprovoked and murderous attacks 
they were witnessing. They were a frustrated group of sailors; they hated to have 
to restrain themselves while atrocities were carried out in front of their eyes.”31 
Neither Crowe’s nor Weinberger’s memoirs comment on Iraq’s also-murderous 
and equally illegal use of chemical weapons against civilians. While offshore 
balancing, oil supply, and loyalty to local allies were important, subconsciously 
he may have viewed the Iranians’ real crimes as threefold. First, they had held 
Americans hostage—American diplomats in Tehran and other American citizens 
held by Hezbollah in Lebanon. Second, they gloated over America’s military fail-
ure during the hostage rescue mission. Third, by attacking neutral shipping with 
impunity, they made the Persian Gulf an area of lawlessness, and by extension 
made the American naval forces on hand look powerless.
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As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Crowe was the highest- 
ranking military officer in the nation. He also was, by statute, the president’s mili-
tary adviser. However, he was outside the chain of command for military opera-
tions; those plans ran through Secretary Weinberger. So while Admiral Crowe’s 
recommendation carried considerable weight, Secretary Weinberger spoke with 
the official DoD voice on reflagging.
The reflagging proposal was debated within the U.S. National Security Coun-
cil (NSC) interagency process. DoD and the NSC were for reflagging, while the 
State Department was against it. President Reagan concurred with the DoD/NSC 
position. On 17 March 1987, Admiral Crowe delivered America’s formal offer 
to Kuwait’s emir, Sheikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah, to escort KOTC’s oil tankers, 
either under their Kuwaiti flags or as properly reflagged American ships.32
Around the same time, the administration alerted Congress to its intentions. 
The reflagging would not require extra appropriations. Although the actual 
exchange of flags would be done “by the book,” according to U.S. Coast Guard 
regulations, DoD tried to expedite certain steps. Administration lawyers felt they 
did not need legislation to authorize the escort. The 1973 War Powers Resolution 
had set tough notification and approval requirements on a president regarding 
the use of military forces, but Weinberger thought these approval procedures 
did not apply to the reflagging; and Reagan, like all presidents since its pass-
ing, considered the War Powers Resolution unconstitutional. Admiral Crowe 
recalled congressional opposition during hearings on the reflagging as intense. 
Weinberger, a career politician and former legislator, considered it desultory 
posturing by opposition Democrats. The Iran-Contra scandal was a much bigger 
deal for Congress. Senator John G. Tower had released a report on the scandal 
on 25 February 1987, identifying administration errors. The Tower Commission 
had settled nothing, however. Another congressional entity with a wider scope 
and subpoena power was authorized in January 1987, and it was preparing for 
hearings during the reflagging debate.33
On 15 May 1987, KOTC lawyers finished the paperwork that created Chesa-
peake Shipping Inc., a corporation based in Dover, Delaware, that had “no 
employees, with ‘offices’ consisting of a mail drop at another company that 
specialized in dummy corporations, and controlling assets (the tankers) valued 
at approximately $350 million.”34 At this point, Operation EARNEST WILL was 
ready to start.
However, two days later an Iraqi Mirage jet hit USS Stark, a frigate, with two 
missiles. Stark had been conducting routine patrolling activities in the central 
Persian Gulf when it was hit. Heroic crew efforts extinguished fires and saved the 
ship from sinking, but the impact and conflagration killed thirty-seven sailors. 
Congress was livid. On 22 May 1987, the Senate demanded more information on 
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EARNEST WILL, and by the next day a congressional delegation of investigators 
had arrived at the U.S. naval base in Bahrain to interview survivors. Iraq imme-
diately apologized. The Navy investigation assessed the incident to have been an 
accident—the Mirage had been looking for shipping bound for Iran.
Stark had missile countermeasures, but had not defended itself, because it 
did not see the Iraqi aircraft as a threat. The problem was as much cognitive as 
technological. Naval tacticians long had feared combat in the congested Persian 
Gulf; American ships were designed for combat in open oceans. Admiral Crowe, 
among others, noted that encounters in the Gulf ’s confines left little time for hu-
mans to interpret data, identify a threat, and take countermeasures. Because of 
this, America’s aircraft carriers remained in the open waters of the Indian Ocean 
for the duration of EARNEST WILL.
While the crew of USS Stark made mistakes, the Iraqi Mirage pilot was grossly 
negligent. He carried sophisticated radar and other sensors, yet did not identify 
that his target was a 4,100-ton Perry-class frigate instead of his desired prey: a 
two-hundred-thousand-ton very large crude carrier (i.e., a supertanker).
Despite this fact, America quickly blamed Iran for the tragedy. The day after 
the attack Reagan stated during a press conference that “the villain in this piece 
really is Iran.”35 On 20 May 1987, Secretary of State George P. Shultz wrote to 
Congress, “Quite apart from the Iraqi attack on the USS Stark, Iran continues 
publicly and privately to threaten shipping in the Gulf. It is this basic Iranian 
threat to the free flow of oil and to the principle of freedom of navigation which 
is unacceptable.”36 The anti-Iranian narrative continued.
Nothing had changed to tilt U.S. policy in the region away from supporting 
Iraq in strategy or narrative. On 16 June 1987, Michael Armacost, the Under 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, addressed the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee to justify EARNEST WILL. Regarding the Iran-Iraq War, he testified 
that “[w]e do not wish to see an Iranian victory in that terrible conflict.” Yet in the 
very next sentence he stressed, “Nevertheless, the United States remains formally 
neutral in the war.”37
Because of the Stark incident, America’s “neutral intervention” now grew in 
scope. Congress insisted that the Navy establish robust rules of engagement. The 
rules would, for instance, have allowed Stark to order the Mirage to change course 
as it approached or to open fire on it if it refused. The Navy now planned to send 
more ships to the Gulf as well. Weinberger told General George B. Crist, USMC, 
commander of the EARNEST WILL JTF, to ask for any asset he felt he needed to 
conduct the operation.38 In June, Weinberger convinced the Saudis to let the 
EARNEST WILL JTF connect the radar feeds from the ELF-1 surveillance aircraft 
to its naval ships, giving the United States better situational awareness.
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The Reagan administration initiated a strategic communications campaign 
to address congressional opposition and political posturing. Under Secretary 
Armacost and Secretary Weinberger both delivered lengthy statements to con-
gressional committees on U.S. policy. In justifying EARNEST WILL and Stark’s 
sacrifice, the statements described strategic concerns of encroaching Soviet 
influence in the Gulf as well as economic ones regarding free flow of commerce.
Oil, of course, was the key element of this commerce. Armacost testified that 
“[t]he unimpeded flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz is a vital interest.”39 
Vital interests generally are understood to be those over which America is pre-
pared to fight. A subsequent national security document defined them as “those 
directly connected to the survival, safety, and vitality of our nation.”40 Armacost 
reiterated the Carter Doctrine’s affirmation that “[a]n attempt by any outside 
force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on 
the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be 
repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”41 EARNEST WILL was 
the Carter Doctrine’s first explicit test.
In addition to the Soviets’ geopolitical threat, America had a collective psy-
chological fear of oil shortages. President Reagan addressed this concern during 
a 29 May 1987 radio address. In justifying EARNEST WILL, Reagan recalled the 
1970s oil shocks and their deleterious effects on the U.S. economy. He argued that 
“[t]his could happen again if Iran and the Soviet Union were able to impose their 
will upon the friendly Arab States of the Persian Gulf, and Iran was allowed to 
block the free passage of neutral shipping.”42
AN UNDECLARED WAR WITH IRAN
Iran did not acquiesce to the convoys’ presence when the larger and more ag-
gressive JTF started EARNEST WILL. The Iranians continued to strike neutral 
shipping with aircraft and ships. They directly challenged the United States by 
laying mines along convoy routes (while denying constantly that they were doing 
so). The Iranian navy acted aggressively toward U.S. forces supporting the convoy 
missions. Three distinct Iranian actions—the mining of SS Bridgeton, the attack 
on SS Sea Isle City, and the mining of USS Samuel B. Roberts—prompted the U.S. 
military to retaliate against Iran with military force.
The first EARNEST WILL convoy did not take place until 22 July 1987, when 
USS Kidd and USS Fox escorted SS Bridgeton, an ultralarge crude carrier that dis-
placed four hundred thousand tons. Bridgeton, nominally homeported in Phila-
delphia, had until shortly before this convoy been the Kuwaiti ship Al-Rekkah. In 
a bit of irony, Kidd, a state-of-the-art destroyer designed for work in the tropics, 
originally had been ordered and bought by prerevolutionary Iran. After the shah’s 
ousting and the cessation of weapons transfers, the U.S. Navy took the ship.
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The convoy started inauspiciously: Bridgeton hit a mine on 24 July 1987, while 
transiting the Gulf to pick up crude oil in Kuwait. The explosion punctured the 
tanker but did not stop it. As if it were not enough that its escorts could not pro-
tect it, Kidd and Fox escaped the minefield by having Bridgeton lead while the 
warships followed in its wake; sailors reckoned that a four-hundred-thousand-
ton supertanker in ballast is nearly impossible to sink with mines, while a 7,900-
ton destroyer loaded with fuel and ammunition was at considerable risk.
The Navy reacted to the Bridgeton mining by launching an offensive to find 
and destroy the Iranian minelayer. Washington reinforced the EARNEST WILL JTF 
with special operations forces (SOFs) and intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance assets that could find and track the civilian Iranian ships suspected of 
laying mines surreptitiously. On 21 September 1987, they succeeded. SOF heli-
copters, working at night, caught the fishing ship Iran Ajr in the act. U.S. SOFs 
captured Iran Ajr in a daring raid and the Navy videotaped its deadly cargo for 
the world to see.
On 16 October 1987, an Iranian Silkworm missile hit SS Sea Isle City. The 
United States responded by destroying an oil platform.
When Samuel B. Roberts hit a mine on 14 April 1988, the United States ratch-
eted up its response. Unlike Bridgeton, which survived with a small hole, “Sammy 
B” burned, flooded, and almost sank. In retaliation, Admiral Crowe ordered the 
JTF to destroy two oil platforms and a frigate: “sink the Sabalan,” Crowe cabled 
the commander; “put it on the bottom.”43 In a one-day offensive code-named 
Operation PRAYING MANTIS, the EARNEST WILL JTF destroyed the platforms, 
several speedboats, and damaged Sabalan. Unsatisfied with a partial victory, a 
surface task force located the frigate Joshan. USS Wainwright signaled the Joshan 
crew, “Stop and abandon ship, I intend to sink you.”44 Joshan responded with a 
missile that missed its target; USS Simpson responded with four that did not. 
Simpson’s salvo, along with a flurry of gunfire from other ships in the task force, 
destroyed Joshan and earned Simpson its rare distinction as a ship killer.
Amazingly, Iranian provocations continued until the Iran Air Flight 655 trag-
edy. On 3 July 1988, USS Vincennes, while under attack by Iranian speedboats, 
mistook a civilian Airbus airliner for an attacking fighter aircraft and shot it 
down. The United States paid sixty-one million dollars in compensation while 
denying guilt for the incident. Vice President George H. W. Bush summed up 
America’s position regarding the downing of the Airbus during a speech at the 
UNSC. “The critical issue confronting this body is not the how and why of Iran 
Air 655. It is the continuing refusal of the Government of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran to comply with Resolution 598, to negotiate an end to the war with Iraq, 
and to cease its acts of aggression against neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf.”45
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Iran garnered little sympathy at the United Nations. America’s unofficial war 
in the Persian Gulf was preceded by the United States blaming Iran for a mistaken 
attack launched by the Iraqis. The war then concluded, in a sense, with the United 
States blaming Iran for the mistaken attack against Iran Air 655. There were no 
more major engagements after Vincennes’s incident with the speedboats and the 
downing of Iran Air Flight 655. By July 1988, Iran was defeated thoroughly on 
the battlefield. The Vincennes episode and PRAYING MANTIS both coincided with 
Iraqi victories. An exhausted Iran sued for peace later in July—which Supreme 
Leader Ali Khamenei likened to “drinking hemlock for me.”46 EARNEST WILL 
continued escorting tankers quietly until December 1989.47
TWO FACTORS OF EXPLANATION
The Scourge of Communism and Reagan’s Response: Ideological Drivers Spark 
a Great-Power Competition
The threat of the Soviet Union involving itself in the Persian Gulf proved to be 
the most powerful driver of American foreign policy preceding EARNEST WILL. 
The fear that the Soviet Union would escort Kuwaiti oil tankers and thereby 
gain a foothold in the Persian Gulf—the fuel tank of the free world’s oil-based 
economy—motivated the United States to counter the Soviets’ offer. The Soviet 
threat mobilized Washington in a way that years of carnage, attacks on neutral 
shipping, including oil supplies, and deep-seated hatred of the Iranian govern-
ment could not. Public statements from DoD and the State Department as well 
as President Reagan’s own comments cited the centrality of the Soviet communist 
threat in justifying EARNEST WILL. There is little chance that this was posturing 
simply for public consumption; the fear of communism in the United States (and 
particularly in the Republican Party) was strong and long-standing, and anticom-
munism was a central tenet of the Reagan administration.
From the start, Marxist-Leninist Moscow and laissez-faire Washington had 
diametrically opposed worldviews. Lenin summed up the Manichaean struggle 
as follows: “As long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live in peace: in 
the end, one or the other will triumph—a funeral dirge will be sung either over 
the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism.”48 Reagan was very much aware of 
and in agreement with Lenin’s view on the dichotomy; in 1983, during a speech 
to the National Association of Evangelicals, he likened the communist leadership 
to a demon depicted in the C. S. Lewis novel The Screwtape Letters, and called the 
USSR an “evil empire.”
After an alliance of convenience during World War II, this conflict morphed 
into great-power competition and solidified into the Cold War. The struggle’s 
early phases were marked by the Truman Doctrine and the policy of containment, 
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both of which sought to box in the Soviet Union and respond to provocations in 
countries such as Greece, Turkey, and South Korea. A rebuilt Europe and, espe-
cially, a unified Germany were great sources of potential power. Superpowers 
contended over them, as they did countries on the periphery such as Greece, 
Turkey, Israel, and Kuwait.
The Persian Gulf was an active Cold War theater. America’s first brush with 
oil shortage, the 1973 embargo, was driven by great-power politics. America’s 
support for Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War that so inflamed Arab senti-
ments was part of a balancing act against the Soviet client states of Egypt and 
Syria. During EARNEST WILL, America was in Bahrain, as a tenant at a small na-
val base, because it had subsumed Britain’s regional security responsibilities after 
British forces withdrew in 1971. Laissez-faire America could have relied on the 
free market to keep oil flowing, but it decided that it was important to prevent a 
hegemon from taking charge in the region. So it put in place its small naval pres-
ence and promoted the twin-pillar policies of supporting rivals Iran and Saudi 
Arabia to police the area.
Even the nation’s core strategy for the Middle East, the Carter Doctrine, is at its 
heart about great-power politics. The shah fled Iran in January 1979; the Carter 
Doctrine was not promulgated until the January 1980 State of the Union address. 
Iranian destabilization was a critical foreign policy problem, but the precipitating 
event for the speech was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. 
The Soviets are mentioned thirty-two times in Carter’s 1980 speech, Iran only six. 
America’s pledge to prevent Soviet hegemony in the Persian Gulf was consonant 
with its grand strategy of containment and its regional strategy of keeping the 
Soviets away from critical resources. John Mearsheimer offers Reagan’s execution 
of the Carter Doctrine / containment as a successful example of offshore balanc-
ing, as it relied primarily on proxies and, when needed, used expeditionary forces 
rather than those stationed at permanent forward bases.49
In this context, it should not be surprising that a threat of Soviet involvement 
in the Gulf, however slight, prompted an American response. Kuwait previously 
had been a British protectorate; although not a liberal nation, it previously had 
been in the American orbit. The Islamic Revolution shifted Iran to the neutral 
column, and this concerned the United States greatly. Also, while the United 
States faced (conventional) parity or (nuclear) mutually assured destruction on 
potential battlefields such as those in Korea or central Europe, it had the potential 
to exert hegemony in the Persian Gulf theater. Reagan greatly expanded the Navy, 
to nearly six hundred ships. It could support EARNEST WILL and more, without 
removing aircraft carrier battle groups from critical sea-lanes in the Atlantic and 
Pacific. In contrast, the Soviet navy’s strength was its submarines. Its surface craft 
were few and could not operate for long in the Gulf, since they lacked forward 
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operating bases. While the Soviets lacked staying power, America could use its 
bases in Bahrain and Diego Garcia (the latter in the Indian Ocean) to support its 
military escort strategy and political objectives of boxing out the Soviets.
Secretary of Defense Weinberger unequivocally identified Soviet involvement 
as a threat the United States must avoid, even if it played into Kuwait’s hands. The 
position of Secretary of State Shultz was less hard-line; he supported EARNEST 
WILL, but accepted the possibility of some minimal Soviet naval presence in the 
Gulf, to avoid giving the Kuwaitis what they wanted. Still, his position was clear. 
“The idea of the Soviets playing a key maritime role in the Gulf had no appeal to 
us.”50 He describes the reflagging as one of the few times he and Weinberger saw 
eye to eye on a military matter.
The Reagan administration’s official rationale on reflagging, delivered to Con-
gress by Under Secretary Armacost, listed protecting Kuwait from Iran first and 
prevention of Soviet influence second. Yet this ignores the fact that neither the 
United States nor the world oil markets cared one bit about Kuwait’s predicament 
until the country approached the Soviets—and let the United States know about 
it—in the fall of 1987.
EARNEST WILL was classic offensive realist offshore balancing. The United 
States kept the Soviet Union and Iran out, and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in, 
while avoiding a permanent large garrison in the Gulf (its base in Bahrain was 
tiny). Reagan’s desire to confront perceived Soviet expansion more aggressively 
does much to explain the foreign policy decision to engage in EARNEST WILL. 
Its explanatory power stands in contrast to the proximate reason for Kuwait’s 
predicament. Protection of oil flows, as shown in the next section, played little 
strategic role in EARNEST WILL, despite the strategic proclamations of the Carter 
Doctrine and the administration’s communication efforts to remind Congress of 
its importance to the U.S. economy.
The Global Commons and Protecting Oil Flow— 
a Mediocre Explanation of Events
In his memoir, Secretary of Defense Weinberger justified EARNEST WILL as an 
effort to keep Soviet influence out of the Gulf. However, while he mentioned the 
Soviet threat during his June 1987 testimony to Congress, in this public forum 
oil and economic arguments took center stage—he mentioned them at least six 
times. The Persian Gulf was a vital interest, he testified. “Our ability to continue 
to develop economically and to maintain the way of life we are accustomed to 
depends on our unimpeded access to this oil.”51
President Reagan’s messaging during a 29 May 1987 press briefing matched 
that of his Defense Secretary. Reagan’s remarks occurred shortly after the Iraqi 
missile hit USS Stark and one week after the Senate formally requested more 
17
Marvin: Operation Earnest Will—The U.S. Foreign Policy behind U.S. Naval
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 9 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
information on Operation EARNEST WILL. Reagan hits the domestic implications 
of the Gulf crisis hard and early.
It may be easy for some, after a near record 54-month economic recovery, to forget 
just how critical the Persian Gulf is to our national security. But I think everyone in 
this room and everyone hearing my voice now can remember the woeful impact of 
the Middle East oil crisis of a few years ago: the endless, demoralizing gas lines; the 
shortages; the rationing; the escalating energy prices; the double-digit inflation; and 
the enormous dislocation that shook our economy to its foundations.52
Yet while the public messaging around EARNEST WILL focused on the resource 
narrative, neither politicians’ memoirs nor military planning accounts show an 
immediate or quantifiable concern over oil access. Despite quotations of bar-
rels exported, forecasts of America’s future reliance on Gulf oil, and evocations 
(implicit and explicit) of the 1973 Arab oil embargo, oil was cheap in 1987, and 
concern—on the part of both policy makers and the public and congressmen they 
sought to influence—was ideational.
Domestic fears of oil shortages dated back to the 1973 Arab oil embargo, which 
Arab oil producers had imposed in retaliation for America’s steadfast support of 
Israel during the Yom Kippur War. Although the actual supply disruption was 
neither complete nor lengthy, it shocked the country. The 1979 Iranian Revolu-
tion brought a new series of oil shocks and spectacular price hikes—from four-
teen to thirty-five dollars per barrel by 1981.53 But the shocks also encouraged ex-
ploration and technology. By the time of Operation EARNEST WILL, oil was cheap 
despite the blockade of Umm Qasr and the occasional sinking of tankers bearing 
Kuwaiti, Saudi, or Iranian crude destined for the world market. Yet American 
consumers remained psychologically vulnerable to the threat of oil price spikes.
The Iran-Iraq War had little long-term effect on global oil prices. Iraq’s initial 
invasion did cause a price spike; a barrel of crude rose from fifty-three dollars in 
September 1980 to sixty-three dollars by February 1981, a 19 percent increase, 
as Iran and Iraq assiduously bombed and shelled each other’s oil infrastructure.54 
But the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (i.e., OPEC) replaced 
all crude oil taken off the market by the war within a few months of the war’s 
onset, and prices dropped to prewar levels by mid-1982. During this period, 
America’s concerns were geopolitical more than economic. Iran was an Islamic 
republic seeking to export revolution, and the United States tilted against Iran as 
a result. Iraq escaped censure in the UNSC even though it was the aggressor, and 
the United States launched Operation STAUNCH against Iran.
The expansion of the conflict into the tanker war likewise did not move the 
markets. Iranian and Iraqi oil exports actually expanded slightly when the tanker 
war began.55 The market situation was unchanged by 1986 the year Kuwait grew 
concerned about its fleet. Prices fluctuated quite a bit in 1986 (price fluctuations 
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on the futures market averaged forty cents per day, compared with a historical 
average of twenty cents per day from 1983 to 2015), but when Kuwait made its 
overtures to the superpowers in November, a futures contract for a barrel stood 
at $14.71—far below the price at the beginning of the year (2 January) of $25.56.56 
To be sure, insurance rates rose fivefold during this time. At one point, under-
writers judged the Gulf to be more dangerous than sea-lanes during World War 
II.57 At times it was impossible to insure a supertanker filling up at Iran’s Kharg 
Island; Iran had to self-insure. Yet this was a problem for the sailors. And for the 
insurance market; Lloyd’s of London controlled most of the premiums, but 10 
Downing Street made no offer to Kuwait to protect its tankers, nor did it call for 
an international escorting scheme. Once EARNEST WILL started, Secretary Wein-
berger asked the British whether they would like to participate, but America’s 
greatest ally demurred.58
Geography made Kuwait’s risks political and unique. The country sought a 
political solution to the risk, and America’s response, while tied to Kuwait’s oil 
wealth, was underpinned by geopolitical competition first and market funda-
mentals second. EARNEST WILL would not have happened without the oil, but 
the oil market did not drive American policy makers. An analysis of oil market 
fundamentals during the tanker war, reinforced by the silence on the oil situation 
in key memoirs, makes it clear that arguments about oil in front of Congress ad-
dressed theoretical concerns and amounted to debating points aimed at getting 
congressional approval.
Oil was a factor in EARNEST WILL, but it was a nested factor. If Kuwait chose 
the Soviet Union to escort all eleven of its tankers, it might spark a permanent 
Soviet presence in the Gulf. This might embolden the Soviets to seize control of 
the Gulf one day, even though doing so would require incorporating several large 
countries (in terms of both population and geography) in an opposed campaign. 
If this were successful, the Soviets—a net oil exporter already—might decide to 
keep the extra oil off the market (although it had exported oil throughout its 
history, even during the 1920s—when it was a pariah state). This would have a 
serious effect on the U.S. economy, as had previous regional disruptions in 1973, 
1978, and 1979. Still, it is critical to understand that this is a nested factor, as in a 
matryoshka doll. The Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Energy 
may have been paying close attention to the oil flow during the tanker war, but 
they did not raise an alarm. Oil security may have helped sell the deployment, but 
the rationale behind the deployment was power geopolitics.
Basil Liddell Hart wrote that the objective of war is to secure a better peace.59 In 
that sense, EARNEST WILL succeeded in this episode of offshore balancing during 
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the long Cold War. America kept the Soviets out; the Kuwaitis in; and the Iranians 
down, to the extent that they sued for peace within a year of the operation’s onset.
First, the JTF protected the KOTC’s reflagged (and therefore American) super-
tankers. While the Soviets did make a show of sending a few warships to the Gulf, 
they did not attempt to challenge U.S. regional hegemony.
Second, EARNEST WILL began to bring the mercurial Kuwaiti royal family into 
America’s orbit. This process would be complete three years later when, following 
DESERT STORM, the world’s most powerful democracy liberated the tiny country 
and reinstalled its royal family as rulers without a whisper about potential politi-
cal reforms, such as moving toward a representative government. Additionally, 
the reflagging effort improved U.S. standing with GCC members, particularly 
Saudi Arabia. GCC members previously had been disappointed with America’s 
inability to approve arms-transfer deals for sophisticated weapons its members 
demanded. Also, America’s strategic approach in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and 
Lebanon had given some nations the impression that the United States was a 
fickle ally, likely to cut and run. The fact that the United States stayed in the Gulf 
after the casualties of the USS Stark incident, and that its sailors obviously had 
no compunctions against closing with and destroying the Iranian navy, renewed 
the value of American military friendship in the region.
Third, EARNEST WILL contributed to defeating Iran. The second half of 
EARNEST WILL coincided with a spectacular series of Iraqi victories. Iran’s navy, 
with its missile-armed frigates and covert minelayers, was one of the country’s 
comparative advantages over Iraq. But EARNEST WILL neutralized it, along with 
any hope Tehran had that a maritime-interdiction campaign would isolate Iraq 
or convince GCC members to deny Baghdad vital financial support. The JTF’s 
largest operation against the Iranian navy, Operation PRAYING MANTIS, was by 
coincidence launched simultaneously with Iraq’s massive ground attack to retake 
the strategic al-Faw peninsula. This reinforced the existing attitude in Tehran 
that Washington and Baghdad were coordinating in their war against the Islamic 
republic. After Vincennes’s tragic downing of an Iranian civilian Airbus, Iran 
quickly sued for peace. In his letter to UN secretary general Javier Pérez de Cuél-
lar, Supreme Leader Khamenei identified the aircraft’s downing as an example of 
widening the war and a direct cause of his desire to offer peace terms.60
The EARNEST WILL episode suggests that the principles of strategy (such as 
containment) matter, but that specific foreign policy formulations will require 
improvisation within strategic confines. When the Kuwaitis approached the 
United States with the reflagging proposal, American policy makers did not 
respond from the Carter Doctrine playbook, and they did not approach the 
problem as rational actors strictly seeking the optimal response to the royal fam-
ily’s overture. They did, however, act within the framework of the decades-old 
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strategy of containment. America’s desire to stymie the Soviet Union and keep 
it from obtaining hegemony in the Persian Gulf proved a powerful catalyst to 
get the United States involved. Still, while the specific strategy framework was 
preexisting, the details of the American response were ad hoc. Policy makers 
improvised actions that were specific to the tanker threat’s time and place. Kuwait 
seized the initiative in the reflagging episode by making simultaneous overtures 
for assistance to both Washington and Moscow. When American leaders formed 
a policy to address this development, that policy was shaped by their notions of 
containment, their fear of Soviet influence, and their antipathy toward Iran. The 
United States responded forcefully to the threat of a few Soviet escorts in the Gulf 
even though it had done little regarding all the Iranian navy had done up to that 
point, including boarding a U.S. ship.
During any future inevitable policy improvisations, policy makers would do 
well to drill down into their key assumptions. For instance, oil is indeed critical to 
the world economy, but for all the success of EARNEST WILL there is no evidence 
the operation was necessary to secure the flow of crude oil through the Strait of 
Hormuz or a decent price for it on the world spot and futures markets; macro-
economic factors far outweighed the JTF’s efforts in this regard. EARNEST WILL 
was, in one sense, a subsidy for Kuwaiti crude—another point that policy makers 
should ponder when they determine future interventions in the Persian Gulf or 
other places rich in commodities.
However, in the greater context of containment, EARNEST WILL succeeded, 
and it did so without creating an open-ended military commitment. In an era 
of strained resources and multiple theaters vying for attention, policy makers 
should ensure that, given the uncertainty of any military action, capabilities are 
well matched to objective ends. As Richard Betts has observed, “strategy fails 
when means prove insufficient to the ends.”61 EARNEST WILL paid off because of 
military overmatch and America’s strong commitment to containing an existen-
tial threat—factors that are not always present.
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